Who Tells the Story? On Soviet War Memorials in Norway

In Finnmark, the northern region of Norway bordering with Russia, there are still numerous monuments to Soviet soldiers. They are reminders of the October 1944 offensive, when the Red Army entered Norway to retake it from the Germans and, together with Norwegian troops, liberate the region. Since the 1990s, and in particular since 2014, other memorials have been erected to accompany those from the Soviet era. Both old and new monuments have been increasingly turning into the axis of Russian disinformation targeting Norwegian society. 

Kirkenes is a small town in northern Norway, right on the border with Russia, with a population of just over 3,000. Although Norwegian-Russian relations in the region go back to the times long before the Second World War, the traces of this very conflict have left the deepest mark on the local area. 

Invaded by Germany, Norway entered World War II on 9 April 1940. During the occupation, the country was home to both a resistance movement and the collaborationist government of Vidkun Quisling, who became a symbol of national treason.  

One of the most telling remnants of the German occupation in Kirkenes is the town’s Andersgrotta shelter. What is a tourist attraction today provided refuge to local residents during regular bombing. At that time, Kirkenes was an important strategic point – a garrison of German occupation troops was stationed here to control the route to the port of Murmansk.  

Red Army soldiers played a significant role in the liberation of Norway. The Soviet offensive forced German troops to withdraw to the Kirkenes area, which was finally recaptured by the Soviets on 20 October 1944. A few months later, on 8 May 1945, the German forces that were still present in Norway capitulated. 

Frigjøringsmonumentet – the Liberation Monument – is a symbol of the former military collaboration between Norway and the USSR. Standing in the heart of Kirkenes, this almost 5-metre-high statue of a Soviet soldier, also known as the Russian Monument, is a reminder of the joint efforts in the fight against German occupation.  

It is one of many similar monuments that can be found in Finnmark. Over the decades, they have grown into the space of Norwegian cities and towns. They are unequivocally associated with liberation from German occupation, which – unlike in the countries of Eastern Europe – did not transform into a new, Soviet one. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, however, the public perception of the monuments has been changing, as the Russian authorities seek to utilise them as a propaganda tool.  

A memorial to Red Army soldiers in Kirkenes, Norway. At its foot, there are wreaths arranged in the colours of the Russian flag.

CTHOE, CC BY-SA. Source: Wikimedia Commons 

Monuments are powerless 

Despite their might and mass, the monuments seem powerless, silent and frozen in time. They are deprived of any possibility to influence the reality around them. Yet, it is precisely their defencelessness that turns them into a memory battleground. Governments, politicians, activists and ordinary citizens alike try to influence their meaning and context. Ann Rigney, a researcher from Utrecht University, describes the two most common tactics. The first is to transfer a monument from its current location to a museum. Then, it becomes one more heritage artefact in the museum collection, absent from the urban space. Such a monument, just like the memory associated with it, ceases to be a point of reference. The second is an attempt to add a new meaning to it by changing the plaque, official narrative or sometimes by an act of devastation. 

The Soviet Army monument in Sofia repainted in the colours of the Ukrainian flag on 24 February 2014 during the Euromaidan Protests, just before the Russian invasion of the Donbas. The inscription ‘Glory to Ukraine’ appeared on the pedestal. In 2023, the monument was dismantled.

Fot. Vassia Atanassova, CC BY-SA 3.0. Source: Wikimedia Commons

The phenomenon of monument reinterpretation can be observed throughout the entire former Eastern Bloc. One of the more notorious examples is the Soviet Army monument in Sofia. On 24 February 2014, during the Euromaidan Protests, it was repainted in the colours of the Ukrainian flag. On the pedestal, the following inscription appeared: ‘Glory to Ukraine’. Nine years later, in 2023, the monument was dismantled.  

Since 2014, the Russian authorities, eager to undermine the integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, have used memorials as a tool of influence and propaganda. The authorities try to update the message conveyed by the monuments by adding a new meaning to it, in line with the Kremlin’s narrative. This also applies to the Norwegian monuments officially commemorating the Red Army’s participation in the fight against the Germans in 1944.  

In parallel, Russia has been erecting its own monuments to honour soldiers killed in the war against Ukraine. According to independent researcher Alexandra Polivanova of the Memorial organisation, more than 3,000 of such monuments had been unveiled across Russia by 2023 alone. This means an average of five new commemorations per day since the beginning of the invasion.  

At the same time, monuments to victims of Soviet totalitarianism are being systematically removed from public space. It is a consistent policy of replacing the remembrance of suffering with the glorification of military heroes. 

The Russian Federation is not allowed to erect any monuments directly referring to the war in Ukraine on Norwegian territory. Instead, it reaches for existing monuments – the ones that commemorate the Soviet-Norwegian military collaboration from the period of World War II. They receive a new meaning, following the propaganda tailored to fit the Kremlin’s contemporary narrative. Alongside the old, so-called official, monuments, such as  Frigjøringsmonumentet, new ones appear. They are erected as part of allegedly independent initiatives, although their message and the circumstances of their creation indicate a strictly political character. Even if they formally commemorate the events of 1944, a different story is built around them. 

Here are some examples. In 2011, a Russian memorial was erected in Persfjord on the initiative of Gennadiy Gurylev and Sergey Goncharov, the latter considered an active FSB agent. Seven years later, in 2018, another monument was unveiled in Langbunes – this time it was directly funded by the Russian consulate in Kirkenes. 

‘We are on the same side’ – Russian narrative and Norwegian memory 

The Russian authorities have consistently utilised the memory of the joint liberation of Finnmark to develop a narrative in which Norway and Russia are still allegedly ‘on the same side’. It is about the fight against neo-Nazism, extremism and, citing the Kremlin’s propaganda, a ‘Western conspiracy against Russia.’ 

As noted by Joakim Aalmen Markussen, a researcher of Russia’s memory politics in northern Norway, Norway’s approval of the construction of subsequent Russian monuments can be used as evidence of support for this narrative: 

Norway supports the Russian narrative of World War II. This, in turn, would mean that Norway also supports the distorted worldview developed by the Kremlin on the basis of this narrative – namely that Russia is under attack from the West and that it must fight the alleged spread of neo-Nazism and other paranoid conspiracy theories. 

This theme can also be observed in official speeches delivered by Russian politicians.  

During his visit to Kirkenes in 2019, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said: 

[…] neo-Nazis, extremists are raising their heads. We know that it is also happening in Norway. You had A. Breivik; we also had similar excesses. That is why it is so important what our Norwegian friends do year after year – to preserve historical memory and educate young people and children in the spirit of devotion to the ideals for which their ancestors gave their lives. 

Russian propaganda is keen to portray the government in Kyiv as a neo-Nazi regime and references to World War II, including the joint liberation of Norway, are intended to legitimise contemporary aggression and build the illusion of an alliance that has never been renewed.  

Norwegian police officers in Lapland with reconnaissance soldiers of the Waffen-SS Mountain Division on the German northeastern front.

Source: East News, Archivbestand Berliner Verlag

Russian calls for a joint commemoration of World War II soon expose accusations. The Norwegian national authorities are blamed for neglecting the memory of the brotherhood of arms with the Red Army and ignoring local needs – especially those of Kirkenes and the country’s northern borderlands. This narrative is not incidental. Building tension between the centre and the regions, especially in the strategic location of Finnmark, is one of the Russian influence policy tools. 

Inconvenient guests 

The Russian narrative based on the events of October 1944 and liberation monuments serves a specific purpose. Firstly, it explains the presence of Russian citizens in the border region, which include potential agents, provocateurs and even saboteurs. Secondly, it paves the way for closer relations with local elites: local government officials, journalists and historians. This is a soft but consistent effort. 

In 2016 – on the initiative of the local authorities of the Russian city of Murmansk – the Russian-Norwegian expert group on the history of partisan fighting against the German-Fascist occupiers in the North during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1944 was established. The very name of the group is telling – it emphasises common interests, uses Russian terminology (Great Patriotic War) and a Russian date range. This is an example of a subtle shift of the emphasis – from local history to a narrative subordinated to the Kremlin’s interests. 

Tanks, wreaths and propaganda 

Russia’s propaganda efforts in northern Norway are all the more effective because local communities still feel genuine gratitude towards the Red Army for liberating Finnmark from German occupation in 1944. This sympathy is scrupulously exploited – support is channelled to local historians, war enthusiasts and sometimes activists linked to Russian institutions.  

They may have been the ones – in collaboration with the command of the Russian Northern Fleet – who sought to install a historical T-34 tank imported from Russia on a memorial devoted to a Soviet partisan act near Vardø. The attempt was thwarted by the regional police who relied on laws prohibiting the import of weapons into the country. 

Russian memorial tourism in Norway 

Visits to monuments and wreath-laying make only part of the activities. Russian memorial tourism in Finnmark is a well-planned soft power campaign combining emotions, symbolism and political messages. The following events are organised and funded from Russian sources: 

• A patriotic film festival in northern Norway, where Russian war films and documentaries are shown to local communities, 

• Victory Marches on the trail of the Red Army attended by Russian youths,8 

• Tours dominated by symbols of the Kremlin and its view of war history (so-called patriotic cross-border tourism). 

The Norwegian authorities and society are aware of the dangers of the Kremlin’s propaganda exploiting Finnmark’s local history. In 2023, Magnus Mæland, chairman of the Sør-Varanger municipality, laid a wreath in silence at the Liberation Monument in Kirkenes. The Russian consul, who showed up at the ceremony uninvited, placed his wreath in such a way as to obscure the Norwegian one. Eventually, the two wreaths were pulled apart, but the main Liberation Day celebrations, including Mæland’s speech, took place at a different memorial, dedicated to civilian victims of the war.9 

Conclusion: monuments as a memory war tool 

World War II continues to be the key theme used by Russia in its propaganda efforts, which requires constant manipulation of history. Perceived by the local community as neutral or often positive symbols of liberation for many years,  the Soviet monuments in Finnmark have now become a tool employed by the Kremlin to achieve its strategic goals.  

Russia utilises them to: 

• undermine the good relationship between Norway’s national authorities and the local government of a strategically important border region, 

• build political influence and undermine pro-Ukrainian public sympathies in Norway through historical collaboration at the local level, 

• equate, at the international level, the fight against Germany with the fight against the ‘neo-Nazi regime in Kyiv’ and create an illusion of a Russian-Norwegian alliance, 

• increase the physical presence of Russian citizens in the border region of Northeastern Norway. 

Used as a tool for community memory building for millennia, monuments may sometimes be exploited in political propaganda. Despite their physical might and permanence, it can be very easy to alter their character and message. Fortunately, not only authoritarian states interested in promoting their own vision of history but also all those who oppose this vision are aware of this vulnerability to reinterpretation. Sometimes all it may take to begin a new story about the past is one word, spray paint or a displaced wreath. 

In 2017, photographer Niels Ackermann and journalist Sébastien Gobert published the album Looking for Lenin. It documents the fate of Lenin monuments destroyed in Ukraine as part of decommunization campaigns. The photographs show monuments stripped of their upper part, painted in Ukrainian colours, or repurposed as makeshift posts for mesh fences or turned into Lord Vader statues. To neutralise a monument, it is not necessary to destroy it — changing its character and message may suffice.https://fuel-design.com/publishing/looking-lenin/ https://www.vice.com/pl/article/jak-ukraina-pozbywa-sie-pomnikow-lenina/

Exercise

Read the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation prepared for the anniversary of the liberation of Norway from German occupation (2019).

Link to the speech

1. Analyse the text of the speech in terms of the ways in which Russia utilises the history of World War II in its propaganda attack against Ukraine’s sovereignty.
2. Identify historical figures from the period of World War II who are cited to justify the Russian attack on Ukraine.
3. Consider why, in his anniversary speech, Lavrov avoids the word Germany, while repeatedly mentioning Nazis.