This lecture provides an overview of how multiple narratives of Europe and the European Union (EU) have been created during the course of history. By examining historical, mythological and cultural narratives – ranging from ancient myths, such as the story of Europa, to Orientalism, Cold War politics and contemporary political speeches – it illustrates the frameworks and contexts of public narratives that have constructed the complex and dynamic collective of European imaginaries. Finally, by analysing the roles of post-war reconciliation and the EU integration process, the EU’s efforts to forge a new, inclusive European narrative that is based on diversity, shared values and grassroots engagement are highlighted. Thus, the lecture emphasises the historical and current European stories that shape public discourses and citizens’ views.
(…) The European Union is a unique political experiment; a project for change that was born and raised among the ruins of a demoralised and long divided continent. Peace and the promotion of democracy, freedom and respect for human dignity, collective solidarity and individual responsibility lie at the heart of European integration.
José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission, 2013)[1]
Europe is not just a reality and an institution embodied in the EU, but also a cultural construction that has been constantly created through myths, histories, documents, pictures, novels and political speeches – narratives that have shaped people’s imaginaries and mindsets. The name ‘Europe’ itself comes from the Latin equivalent of the Greek word Europe. The etymology of the latter is not entirely clear, but Europe may come from europos, meaning ‘gently rising’, but also ‘dark land’. Both of these metaphors are reflected in Europe’s later history, which has been shaped by processes of destruction, such as those experienced during the world wars, and processes of reconstruction during the period of post-war integration.
The origins of ideas about Europe can be traced back to Greek mythology. Europa was a Phoenician princess, the epitome of feminine beauty on Earth. When Zeus saw her on the seashore of Phoenicia, he fell in love with her. Taking the form of a white bull, Zeus abducted Europa to Crete, where she became queen and mother of Zeus’s sons.

How was the idea of Europe constructed? What makes the European identity?
European identity is often defined by pointing to Greek philosophy, Roman law and Christianity as its foundations. Even though Christianity has also left a negative mark on European history (for example, through the Crusades), it has undoubtedly significantly shaped the framework of the European moral system, political doctrines and the creation of the European education system until the Reformation and the Enlightenment.[2]
For centuries, Europe was perceived through the prism of Western civilisation, based on the history of the Roman, Carolingian and German Empires, and considered superior to other civilisations, thus justifying colonial conquests in the name of modernisation. However, colonialism manifested itself not only in the military conquest of new territories but also as an ideological conquest. Napoleon came to Egypt in 1798 not only with soldiers, but he also took along architects, philologists, biologists and historians, whose task was to produce knowledge of Egypt to facilitate its easier subjugation. One of the results of such knowledge productions was the creation of a perception of Egyptians and the Arabic world in general, disseminated in Europe and internalised by Europeans who did not have the opportunity to travel there. In this way, the imagination of the Orient has been constructed, which Edward Said referred to as Orientalism and defined as ‘a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’ (Said, 1977, p. 11). Recurring motifs in representations of paintings, writing and novels included horsemen, harems, palm trees, alleyways, arches and common themes such as idleness, sensuality and violence, as seen in the works of Orientalism’s most renowned artists, including Eugène Delacroix, Jean-Léon Gérôme and John Frederick Lewis. In the 19th century, most Europeans had never been to the region, but the Middle East was a kind of mystery, a region of exotic luxuriance, sensual richness and forbidden pleasures:
A for me, I scarcely shut my eyes. Watching that beautiful creature asleep (she snored, her head against my arm: I had slipped my forefinger under her necklace), my night was one long, infinitely intense reverie – that was why I stayed. I thought of my nights in Paris brothels – a whole series of old memories came back – and I thought of her, of her dance, of her voice as she sang songs that for me were without meaning and even without distinguishable words.[3]
These representations of the Orient have been later reproduced in popular culture, in American movies, fairy tales and media narratives.[4] Indeed, through drawing the line of difference between the West and the Orient, Europe strengthened its self-understanding of superiority, but also the negative imaginary of the Arab countries, resulting in anti-Muslim prejudices that prevail in public discourse to this day and lead to discriminatory acts.[5]
Everything he has touched he has succeeded in … Lord Cromer’s services during the past quarter of a century have raised Egypt from the lowest pitch of social and economic degradation until it now stands among Oriental nations, I believe, absolutely alone, in its prosperity, financial and moral.[6]
However, the narrative of Western European superiority was underpinned not only by bordering on other civilisations and continents, but also within European space by spreading the narrative that Eastern Europe and the Balkans were backwards, barbaric, chaotic, primitive and full of curiosities.[7]
Hence, as Gerard Delanty, British-based sociologist and nd Professor of Sociology and Social & Political Thought at the University of Sussex argues:
‘The history of Europe is the history not only of its unifying ideas, but also of its divisions and frontiers, both internal and external’ (Delanty, 1995, p. 3).[8]
The post-war divided Europe
The destruction wrought on Europe by two world wars did not only mean military losses and material damage. Far more important were the moral consequences of the wars, particularly the Second World War, the Holocaust and the border changes associated with mass population transfers. The defeat of Nazi Germany was not an unequivocal victory for Europe. After the Second World War, Europe was divided by an iron curtain into democratic Western Europe, where a process of reconciliation between feuding nations quickly began as part of a broader European integration, and Eastern Europe, which was enslaved by the Soviet Union, trying to uniform, standardise and transform the Soviet bloc people into socialists. But the people in Eastern Europe have been struggling against Sovietisation. Writers, philosophers and intellectuals, such as Czesław Miłosz, György Konrád and Milan Kundera, developed a narrative of the Central European spirit, a way of thinking and a cultural sense of belonging to the West.
In fact, what does Europe mean to a Hungarian, a Czech, a Pole? For a thousand years their nations have belonged to the part of Europe rooted in Roman Christianity. They have participated in every period of its history. For them, the word ‘Europe’ does not represent a phenomenon of geography but a spiritual notion synonymous with the word ‘West’. The moment Hungary is no longer European – that is, no longer Western – it is driven from its own destiny, beyond its own history: it loses the essence of its identity’ (Milan Kundera, ‘The Tragedy of Central Europe’, 1984).[9]
The fall of communism and the democratic transformation in Central and Eastern European Countries at the end of the 20th century opened up the chance to reunite Europe. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania applied for membership in the EU in the 1990s. The accession process was accompanied by the narrative of ‘return to Europe’ after these countries had been torn from their roots. Indeed, the Eastern Enlargement of the EU on 1 May 2004, when 10 countries joined, marked the most significant expansion in the history of the integration process and signified the end of Europe’s division after the Second World War.
United in diversity? The new narrative of Europe acknowledging its variety
The words of Jacques Delors, a French politician and former President of the European Commission, that ‘nobody falls in love with a Common Market’ are often quoted to justify the EU’s endeavour to create European citizens through strong identification with the EU. The ‘European identity’ project was officially launched with the Declaration on European Identity, published during the European Summit in Copenhagen on 14 December 1973.
The nine member states at that time highlighted three main motives for the European Identity, in particular reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the nine; assessing the level of unity achieved so far among them; and reconsidering the dynamic nature of European unification. This declaration was followed by European symbols such as the flag, the anthem, Europe Day (May 9), the Erasmus Educational Exchange Programme and the Eurovision Song Contest to create emotional links between the rather abstract EC/EU structures and citizens.
What is the core of the new EU narrative?
Within the EU enlargements, encompassing the legacy war atrocities, and the divided collective memory of West and East-Central Europe, the narrative of Europe could no longer be based on superiority. Europe had to acknowledge the increasingly multicultural nature of its society. Hence, in 2000, the official motto of the EU, ‘in varietate concordia’ (united in diversity), was adopted. The EU attempted to convey the success story of European integration, founded on democracy, peace, the rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights, to its citizens. This should serve as a panacea for the democratic legitimacy crisis, explicitly addressing the perception of the EU as an elite-driven project, declining turnout rates in European Parliament elections and rising Euroscepticism. As José Manuel Durão Barroso, the former President of the European Commission, highlighted launching the project ‘A new narrative for Europe’[10] in 2013:
Telling Europe a new narrative will ensure that our citizens are inspired by the great achievements of European culture which are our best assets to rise to the challenges of the 21st century. And that applies not just to our commitment to education, research, innovation, and environmental protection, but also to our solidarity with all those throughout the world who are struggling for those universal values that are so dear to us and on which we have built our community and our Union. And for that to happen Europe does not just need to give hope to people in Europe, it also needs all their energy and all their hopes.
Conclusions
Narratives play a crucial role in the construction of European imaginations and in shaping attitudes toward the EU. Starting with the myth of the Phoenician princess abducted by Zeus, through the imaginary of the European model of modernity and superiority that led to colonialism and military conflicts, to acknowledging the dark sides of history, the story of Europe is anything but unified. Many research projects, including B-Shapes[11], demonstrate that convincing narratives cannot be created solely on the basis of the success story of European integration, and there is no one Europe underpinned by Western civilisation. Critical European studies reveal that multiple Europes, each with their own ‘different historical paths, the geopolitical linkages and the power hierarchies emerged within the European continent since the colonial expansion.’[12]
[1] ‘A new narrative for Europe’, speech by the President of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso, 13 April 2013, Bozar, Brussels, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_13_357
[2] Wolański, J. (2022), ‘Ontologia Europy’, Wszystko Co Najważniejsze, No. 38, 22 March, Warsaw.
[3] Proust, M. (1925/1970), The Guermantes Way, trans. C. K. Scott MoncrielI 1925; reprint ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1970, p. 135, cited in Said, 1977, p. 187.
[4] Said, E. (1977), Orientalism, London: Penguin; see also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVC8EYd_Z_g
[5] European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2024), Being Muslim in the EU/Experiences of Muslims, Vienna: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-being-muslim-in-the-eu_en.pdf
[6] Judd, D. (1968), Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution, 1874–1932, London: MacMillan & Co., p. 286, cited in Said, 1977, p. 35.
[7] See Wolff, L. (1994), Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of the Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Todorova, M. (2009), Imaging the Balkans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[8] Delanty, G. (1995), Inventing Europe. Idea, Identity, Reality. London: Palgrave Macmillan Press.
[9] Kundera, M. (April 1984), ‘The Tragedy of Central Europe’, New York Times Review of Books 31, 7, pp. 33–38.
[10] A new narrative for Europe’, speech by the President of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso, 13 April 2013, Bozar, Brussels, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_13_357
[11] https://www.sdu.dk/en/forskning/forskningsenheder/samf/b-shapes
[12] Boatcă, M. (2013). “Multiple Europes and the Politics of Difference Within.” In The Study of Europe, edited by H. Brunkhorst and G. Grötzinger, 51–66. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, esp. 63–64; cf. Andersen, D., E. Opiłowska, E.-K. Prokkola, Ł. Moll, and S. Svensson (in review), “Shapes of Europe: How Intersecting Geopolitical Bordering Narratives Form Europe in the Light of Polycrisis,” Geopolitics.
